Monsanto's executives' decision to "bet the company" on agricultural biotechnology was a courageous, if not risky one, especially given the general uncertainty as well as ethical controversies that surround biotechnology generally. The amount of the bet by 1996 was $1.5 billion in R&D investment over many years of time. Then CEO Dick Mahoney's confession that "we didn't have a good business plan . . . [but] the science was so intriguing" suggests a belief that biotechnology was somehow key to future competitiveness, even with many significant unanswered questions.
To commercialize Monsanto's products successfully, its Director of Biotech Business Development, Jim Tobin, needed a "value capture strategy." Given the substantial amount of investment and the emerging and central role that agricultural biotechnology was playing in Monsanto's business plan, profit had to be a primary criterion for adopting any strategy. No strategy would be acceptable to the company if it lost significant money (unless the investment could be recouped in other ways). Pursuing profit is not, of course, incompatible with pursuing good, and the sincerity of altruistic motives need not be doubted outright. The challenge is to find a strategy that is also ethically acceptable.
For the profitability criterion to be met, a major obstacle had to be overcome: farmers must not save the genetically modified seed from one year's crop for the next. If farmers save seed, they will purchase less for the following year, thereby reducing demand and making Monsanto's product unprofitable. Therefore, strategies must either rely on some combination of trust and legal enforcement, or technologies that make seed-saving impossible.
The first of the non-technological strategies is licensing. Licensing strategies present various financial difficulties for recovering costs but, in themselves, are not ethically troublesome. As with other non-technological strategies, licensing suffers from the disadvantage that some farmers may save seed for replanting. The option of licensing with an explicit technology fee would serve an educational purpose that might help farmers recognize the purposes of the increased fees and Monsanto's need not only to recover costs but promote other advantages to farmers-including broader environmental benefits, if used as intended. Educational opportunities in these strategies are ethically preferable because they not only promote informed choice, they also allow the farmer to understand better the potential value to the farm operation and the reasons why he or she may not wish to save seed and cost the company profits.
Contracts also serve this educational purpose, as well as promoting capacities to monitor compliance. In addition, contracts promote a stronger recognition of mutual obligations between Monsanto and farmers regarding use of the seed. Unfortunately, contracts also tend to run afoul of established practices of farmers. Contract compliance and violation may pose a threat to relationships-between farmers and Monsanto, and even among neighboring farmers themselves-as contract enforcement becomes litigious and neighbors may be called into conflict with one another.
End-use fees could be implemented in ways that reward good farming while avoiding complications raised by enforcement issues. This strategy would not offer the educational opportunities as readily as other options, and thus would inhibit informed consent and proper practice in compliance with stewardship recommendations that keep use of the product safe and protect neighboring crops.
All of these strategies rely on some manner of preventing seed-saving as an agricultural practice in order to recover investment costs and protect intellectual property. Seed-saving may be more of an issue in the developing world, where the practice is more common and even necessary, given difficult economic circumstances. Thus, prevention of seed-saving would be disruptive to established traditional agricultural practices. Voluntary compliance would likely be insufficient anywhere. And legal enforcement of Monsanto's intellectual property rights, while not unethical in itself, would be ethically troublesome to the extent that it harmed relationships among farmers by encouraging them to report violations by their neighbors.
A final value capturing strategy involves using genetic technology to render seeds sterile after one use, thereby preventing seed-saving and ensuring that farmers would have to repurchase seed and allow Monsanto to realize a profit. The so-called "terminator" genes, by which this is accomplished, are highly controversial for several reasons. They impose a great deal of control on local agriculture by companies that own the patents and thereby control the technology and its application. Farmers outside the United States especially oppose this. Those in poor countries particularly desire inexpensive and locally adapted seed, which is accomplished through established practices of seed-saving. There are also environmental concerns about the terminator genes spreading to other plants in neighboring fields, thereby rendering them sterile as well. In addition, there are concerns about the effects that corporate control of agricultural products will have on genetic diversity. Terminator gene technology has faced widespread public opposition, especiallyaccording to its critics-as a symbol of increasing control of global agriculture by multinational companies like Monsanto.
The ethics of this case also hinge, ultimately, on the ethical justifiability of the products themselves and the application of intellectual property claims to them. Their benefits to human and environmental well-being are tremendous but also largely unproven. In addition there are also uncertainties surrounding risks to human health and the environment. Such uncertainties make consequentialist justifications difficult at present. Monsanto should be employing new technologies only when proven safe and when consumers can make informed choices about their products.
Intellectual property claims on biotechnology-like all intellectual property claims-promote justice in the sense that the investment of time and money into inventions are properly rewarded if the inventions prove beneficial. That provides incentives for inventors and companies to develop products that might promote well-being. Biotechnology, however, represents a more ethically difficult arena, in that it involves the application of a form of property rights to living things. This is not in itself always wrong-such as in the case of owning pets-but it does raise concerns for many people regarding power and control over the modification of life forms.
Ethically, Monsanto has a primary obligation-even above profitability-to make sure that their products and their value capture strategies-at minimum-do not harm others, do not harm the environment, do not harm important human relationships and practices, and do not disrupt economic arrangements that may be more beneficial to farmers than the alternatives entailed by Monsanto's strategies. They should also ensure that the relationships developed with farmers and companies as a result of implementing any contracting strategy be one of truly valid, informed consent, with each party freely and competently entering into agreements with full knowledge of risks, harms, and benefits.
Ultimately, profitability alone cannot justify any strategy that does not satisfy these ethical criteria. The proposed value capture strategies all stumble to varying extents on either ethics or profits or both. Seed-saving issues will render non-technological solutions too impractical to realize a profit, and too unethical in their consequences to be used, at least in some parts of the world. Overall, non-technological value capturing strategies are ethically preferable to the technological one. Because agricultural practices and environments differ, a mixture of strategies may be necessary, depending on context.
In the end, agricultural biotechnology holds great potential to benefit human and environmental well-being. Unfortunately, even if these benefits are realized, the value capturing practices necessary to make them cost-effective do not line up neatly and completely with ethically preferred practices. Mahoney's gamble has left Tobin with no clear solution from business or ethical perspectives. 
